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Three years ago, the world suddenly came to realize how formidable the 
violence of terror can be. Even though the use of terror attacks for political 
aims is not a Twentieth-Century invention, 9/11 marked a radical shift in 
scope. One could even note that, unfortunately, it proved just the first example 
of a persistent feature in the current system. Despite the rhetoric behind the 
expression, therefore, it is not completely improper to talk of a age of terror. 
This does not mean, as someone would claim, that the old categories have 
been wiped out: at the very least, the state remains as a main actor in the 
system and, most importantly, it appears to be unprepared to deal with non-
state actors. Nonetheless, more attention is needed on those transnational 
organizations that feed terror – first and foremost Al-Qaeda. 
Admittedly, given its nature, any speculation on Al-Qaeda is merely 
tentative. Some remarks, however, are due: first, contrary to what is implicit in 
mass media information, it is extremely unlikely that its organizational chart 
follows a rigid hierarchical principle. Obviously, there are different layers, 
each of them submitted to the one above. Yet, there is no single line of 
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command or, in other terms, pyramidal structure. More likely, its structure 
may be organized according to a network-centric principle – which means that 
different cells may be submitted to different lines of command. In other words, 
rather than reflecting the so-called “General Motors model”, Al Qaeda is 
probably arranged according to the “Microsoft” model – a better suited design 
to cope with the need of secrecy and coordination. 
Second, it seems that Al-Qaeda’s borders are anything but defined: 
membership to the organization is open, and groups are constantly added. 
This goes beyond the common description of sleeping Vs active cells. The 
point, on the contrary, is that this feature makes of Al-Qaeda an extremely 
elusive opponent: in fact, new leaders may always rise. New regions may 
come to host these cells – no matter if the host state is pro- or anti-American, 
the population is Muslim or Christian, and so forth. Finally, no place in the 
world could be safe (with the only exception of Switzerland and the Cayman 
Islands), as every group might decide its own target. 
Third, if Al-Qaeda’s membership is open, we should investigate the 
qualifications that make terror groups eligible. Of course, this point is mere 
speculation, as no public information on the point is available. Nonetheless, 
some insight could be drawn by other experiences of organizations.  
Economic theory of contests can suggest interesting reflections. Contests 
are situations in which an individual or a group’s reward depends on its 
performance relative to others. Example can be found in a great variety of 
scenarios. Contests can serve some functions. First many contests select the 
most appropriate individual or group for a given task. Second many contests 
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can imply  incentive mechanisms. Individuals or groups have to choose what 
is the best strategy to win the prize, namely what will be the optimal level of 
efforts to apply. When monitoring and information are costless, the link 
between effort and rewards is quite direct: the greatest effort guarantees the 
prize. Thus, for participants improving their own performance, maximizing 
efforts seem an optimal rational strategy. Imagine al-Qaeda as a firm 
rewarding a prize which is indivisible. The prize consists in official 
membership, which guarantees a huge money transfer 
from Bin Laden bank accounts. When a terrorist group 
bombs an embassy or a trade center with dozen of 
casualties somewhere in the world, and such event is 
extensively broadcasted by international TV networks,  
information costs go near to zero. Since the Al Qaeda 
goal is to spread terror among people, the number of 
casualties as well as  other damages can be assumed to proxy the efforts of 
candidate official member of the terror network. Trying to maximize the 
number of casualties and damages, candidate groups signal the level of their 
efforts, as well as their ability, to the Al Qaeda committee in order to be 
awarded. Spreading the announcement of a single indivisible membership 
prize foster higher efforts from participants. In fact, imagining two prizes, a 
top and a bottom prize, if the latter is relatively high, contestants may choose 
to coast rather than compete. Then, to avoid the risk of either insufficient 
efforts or unskilled candidates, Bin Laden and Al Zawahiri will retain as 
private information any multiple membership reward.  




groups must prove 
capable of 
exceptional 
accomplishments  6 
As a first paradoxical result, attacks and bombings could have been made 
by candidate groups, not by official offshoots of Al Qaeda. Thus, the latest 
examples of ruthless violence (both against children and peace operators) may 
be also explained by this logic. In order to gain membership and money by Al-
Qaeda, raising groups must prove capable of exceptional accomplishments – 
unfortunately in terms of casualties and cruelty. Secondly, indeed, more than a 
conclusion is a question: how long is this logic sustainable? Apparently, an 
e s c a l a t i o n  o f  v i o l e n c e  i s  u n d e r  w a y ,  a n d  m o r e  i s  e x p e c t e d  t o  c o m e  i n  t h e  
future. If Al-Qaeda intends to be selective in rewarding the emerging groups, 
it will be forced to prize only the most effective (i.e. brutal) of them. In the long 
run, one may argue, the threshold of violence needed for membership may be 
intolerable – both for the defender and the offender.  
What is going to happen at that time? Admittedly, addressing this 
question is not only scary – it is impossible at the moment. However, 
sometimes what is important is not giving good answers, but framing good 
questions. If Al-Qaeda follows the logic outlined above, it is bound to face a 
critical problem. 
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